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Secom-D-22/
ICS-4488-85

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

SECOM-D-242

24 September 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Director, Intelligence Community Staff
Deputy Director, Intelligence Community Staff

FROM: [REDACTED]
Chairman

25X1

SUBJECT: Expanded Requirement for Polygraph

REFERENCE: A. SECOM-D-221, dtd 28 Aug 85, Same Subject
B. D/ICS 85-4488, dtd 24 July 85, Subject:
Senior Management Conference Actions

1. In response to your note on the routing sheet of Reference A, the need for Congressional coordination of the proposed NSDD on expanded polygraph use was discussed with David Major, NSC Staff. He was requested by Ken deGraffenreid to respond to my telephone call. [REDACTED]

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2. Mr. Major advised that he has discussed the proposed NSDD with the staffs of the intelligence oversight committees of both houses. He reports that the staff people with whom he discussed the matter appear to be receptive to enhanced polygraph utilization. He also advised that he has offered to brief both the SSCI and HPSCI on counterintelligence issues under consideration by the NSC Staff. [REDACTED]

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3. Mr. Major's actions seem likely to prevent any feeling by the oversight committee staffs that they have not been included in the planning for expanded polygraph use. Issuance of the proposed NSDD may stimulate opposition, but Congressional supporters of the move should be prepared to assist. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Prepared by: SECOM/[REDACTED]

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Distribution:

- Orig - Addressee
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SUBJ: Approved For Release 2009/09/15 : CIA-RDP87M00539R003105050013-1

Expanded Requirement for Polygraph

FROM: Chairman, SECOM 1225 Ames Building		EXTENSION	NO. SECOM-D-221	25X1
			DATE 28 August 1985	25X1
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)	
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. DD/ICS 6S04 CHB	AUG 29 1985		JRF	8/28
2.				
3. D/ICS 6S03 CHB	SEP 6 1985			
4.				
5. DDCI 7E12 Hqs	(copy)			
6.				
7. DeI	SEP 6 1985			
8.				
9.				
10. SECOM 1225 Ames				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

Send to DeI
 Good thinking -
 Take up with K...
 at my request &
 advise on next
 steps & where NSOP
 stands. M...

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

GPO : 1983 O - 41-862

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Security Committee

SECOM-D-221

28 August 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Director, Intelligence Community Staff
Deputy Director, Intelligence Community Staff

FROM:

[Redacted]

Chairman

25X1

SUBJECT: Expanded Requirement for Polygraph

REFERENCE: DCI/ICS 85-4488, dtd 24 July 85,
Subject: Senior Management Conference Actions

1. Action Requested: That you suggest that the NSC Staff coordinate with the Intelligence oversight committees before issuing an NSDD calling for expanded use of the polygraph in clearance actions involving access to SCI.

2. Discussion: At the recent Senior Management Conference, agreement was reached to seek expansion of the use of the polygraph as a prerequisite for clearance for access to sensitive compartmented information. David Major of the NSC Staff advises that, as a result of recent agreement by the National Security Policy Group, a National Security Decision Directive is being drafted requiring expanded use of the polygraph for clearance for certain types of classified information, including SCI.

3. Even though the climate in both the Executive and Legislative Branches of government seems more favorable to enhanced security, including expanded use of the polygraph, failure to lay the proper groundwork could foredoom what essentially is a good, logical security initiative.

4. The fate of NSDD-84, which should have been embraced as a step toward better security for sensitive intelligence information, demonstrates how media and Congressional reaction (as well as lack of Executive Branch enthusiasm) can thwart even the best-intentioned initiative. NSDD-84 was eviscerated by the Jackson Amendment, which derailed the polygraph provision, and the Matthias Amendment, which stymied the prepublication review modification. There are indications that NSDD-84 could have had better Congressional support if there had been some prior coordination. It is a lesson to be remembered and applied.

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5. Because Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) is readily identifiable as data requiring exceptional protection, it seems logical to prescribe polygraph examination as a requirement for SCI access. Other kinds of "sensitive intelligence" would pose an identification problem.

6. Personnel security requirements for access to SCI already are codified in Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/14. The mechanics of prescribing a polygraph examination as a prerequisite for SCI access could be handled by a simple revision of DCID 1/14.

7. Before promulgating such a change, however, the DCI must be prepared to deal with a number of questions and the inevitable objections by opponents of the polygraph. Despite recent defeat of anti-polygraph legislation, these opponents are alive and well. Furthermore, even those who express support for expanded polygraph use will have legitimate questions. These center around the capability to carry out the expanded program and the ability to enforce it at all levels.

8. There are currently approximately [] persons holding SCI access approvals. (If there were full Community participation in the 4C System, a much more nearly precise figure could be obtained. Here again, it is important to note that the seemingly good idea of having a central DCI register of all SCI access approvals has not been enthusiastically embraced by the Community.) Of those [] approximately [] are employees or contractors of CIA or NSA who have been polygraphed. The remaining [] would pose a staggering backlog of polygraph cases that would require unprecedented resources. There are indications that the backlog is growing larger.

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9. The DoD has the capacity to train about 48 polygraphers per year. The Army's school at Ft. McClellan, Alabama, is the only substantial polygraph training capability in the government, except for CIA's. CIA already polygraphs all of its staff and some contractor personnel. Even with projected expansions of the Army program, it would be years before DoD could polygraph all nominees for SCI access. Those opposing the program can be expected to object that the proposal is impossible to implement.

10. Heretofore, the use of polygraph to screen people for access to sensitive information has been largely restricted to CIA and NSA. While there is a surface logic to this, it is less than rational when we consider that many persons outside CIA and NSA have regular access to extremely fragile SCI, but are not screened for access in a comparable manner. Since it is clear that not all SCI-approved persons could be polygraphed at once, the adoption of criteria for priorities would be necessary. One approach would be to polygraph first persons approved for three or more SCI control systems; another would be to designate specific programs, in priority order, for which persons would be polygraphed. Either approach should help overcome objections

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to the inability to implement the entire program at once. It would ensure that first priority is given to those with either the greatest range of access to SCI or those with access to the SCI deemed most sensitive. Therefore, the additional security effort could be shown to be applied where it is needed most.

11. It is important that any expansion of polygraph use not be perceived as ignoring or defying Congressional strictures on DoD polygraph applications. Appropriate liaison with the Congress is needed to avoid such a misperception.

12. The question of enforcement of a polygraph requirement in DCID 1/14 must be addressed. Although the DCI is the head of the Intelligence Community and has the statutory responsibility for protecting intelligence sources and methods, his power to require compliance with edicts issued in either capacity lies primarily in his ability to persuade heads of the Intelligence Community departments and agencies. The polygraph initiative could be difficult to implement if we do not build appropriate top-level support.

13. People are not likely to break down the doors trying to get a polygraph examination. It is entirely possible that some Congressional staffers might try to persuade their sponsors to invoke the separation of powers as a rationale for declining an Executive Branch polygraph. Some political appointees might seek privileged status or threaten to quit rather than be polygraphed. If a workable expansion is to take place, there must be prior agreement that all SCI recipients must participate in the program or relinquish access to SCI. Anything less would be meaningless. Since there is no realistic expectation in the near term of being able to polygraph all SCI access holders, a requirement for an iron-clad agreement to take a polygraph examination when asked is the only way in which the program can be effective.

14. A program to carry out the anticipated NSDD would have the following features:

- a. Each person nominated for SCI access approval would agree to undergo a polygraph examination upon request as a condition precedent to being given access to SCI.



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c. Because counterintelligence-scope polygraph cannot be effective before the individual has a track record of dealing with classified information, it cannot be administered usefully until after the cleared person has dealt with classified material for a period of months or years.

d. Aperiodic follow-up polygraph examinations should be conducted.

e. Polygraph examinations should be administered, in cases of suspected espionage or unauthorized disclosure involving SCI, to persons who may reasonably be expected to have pertinent knowledge, based upon prior investigation.

f. Until a capability has been developed to polygraph all SCI access holders, a priority system will be needed to determine who is polygraphed first. Such a system should be formulated by the managers of the SCI compartmented control systems and the Chairmen of COMIREX, SIGINT and SECOM.

g. Any SCI-approved person who declines to take a polygraph examination under the terms of DCID 1/14 would be debriefed and barred from further access to SCI.

15. The proposal above is far-reaching, but fair. It contemplates comparable security processing as a precedent for comparable access to sensitive information. Presumably, the forthcoming NSDD will be structured so as to permit the adoption of these provisions for SCI.

16. In order to ensure the support of Congressional advocates of stronger security, it is recommended that key members of the intelligence oversight committees be briefed before the issuance of the proposed NSDD, or at least, before efforts to implement the SCI requirement. It is important to have a base of support to help fend off the inevitable efforts to pass legislation disabling the NSDD.

17. Even if it eventuates that legislative opposition could hamstring the total implementation of the NSDD, the current format of DCID 1/14 could provide a framework for increased implementation. DCID 1/14 currently provides that the polygraph may be used in screening SCI nominees in agencies which have polygraph capabilities. With the expansion or initiation of polygraph programs in some agencies, the requirement could be imposed by the heads of those agencies under existing guidelines. It is important that efforts to lay the groundwork for this initiative begin without unnecessary delay.

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18. Action: It is recommended that you suggest to the NSC Staff that precoordination with Congressional leaders could be useful in fending off legislative attacks upon implementation of the proposed NSDD on expanded use of polygraph.



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SECOM-D-221, 28 August 1985

Prepared by: SECOM

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Distribution:

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DCI/ICS 85-4488
24 July 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted]
Chairman, Security Committee

FROM: [redacted]
Director, Intelligence Community Staff

SUBJECT: Senior Management Conference Actions

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1. As a follow-on to the recent Senior Management Conference, you are requested to take the action discussed in paragraph 3.

2. At the conference, the DCI once again made security a primary discussion item and stressed the need to take steps to improve our ability to protect our sources or methods and our sensitive intelligence information. He noted both the recent congressional vote on use of the polygraph, and the public attention that has been focused on security matters. He and the conference attendees agreed that the time seems propitious for a renewed effort to expand the use of the polygraph as a security measure required for access to compartmented information.

3. I should like you to take the lead to develop a comprehensive proposal that addresses options for implementing such an expansion of polygraph use. The principal consideration should be extending polygraph requirements (for access to sensitive sources and methods) to executive and legislative agencies, staffs, and offices that have previously been exempt. Other recommendations for improved use of the polygraph should be included as appropriate.

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